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I. Introduction and Summary 
 
Earlier this week, the D.C. Circuit issued its long-awaited decision in Mozilla v. Federal 
Communications Commission.
1
 The court affirmed the Commission’s Restoring Internet 
Freedom (RIF) Order, identifying some flaws in the agency’s reasoning but finding the agency 
could likely correct those errors on remand without vacatur.
2
 Though largely expected given the 
Supreme Court’s precedent in Brand X,
3
 the decision is nonetheless a sweeping victory for the 
Commission and judicial validation of Chairman Ajit Pai’s light-touch regulatory framework for 
the broadband industry. 
 
While chastened by the ruling, some net neutrality advocates have identified a potential silver 
lining.
4
 The court vacated the portion of the RIF Order that expressly preempted state and local 
broadband regulations.
5
 The court found that the order failed to ground the express preemption 
provision in a lawful source of statutory authority.
6
 Advocates have latched onto this holding as 
permission for legislatures to reimpose at the state level the restrictions that the Commission 
repealed at the federal level. 
 
But these advocates are likely to be disappointed, as this reads too much into the court’s 
decision. Any state effort to regulate broadband providers is still subject to conflict preemption 
2 
 
on a case-by-case basis. As the court explained, “[i]f the Commission can explain how a state 
practice actually undermines the 2018 Order, then it can invoke conflict preemption.”
7
 The court 
recognized that the Order created a “light-touch” regulatory regime that relies on transparency 
and disclosure requirements against a backdrop of consumer protection and antitrust law to 
protect consumers, an approach that the court found reasonable. State laws that disrupt this 
carefully balanced federal policy are likely to be preempted—not by the RIF Order itself, but by 
the Supremacy Clause. In other words, it is unlikely that the courts will allow the Internet—
which, by definition, cannot possibly be segregated into interstate and intrastate components—to 
be governed by state legislators or other local officials in Sacramento, California, or Montpelier, 
Vermont.   
 
II. Mozilla on Preemption 
 
Though the Commission has flip-flopped over the years on the proper regulatory treatment of 
broadband, it has consistently preempted state efforts to regulate broadband. The 2010 Open 
Internet Order explained that the Commission has authority to preempt state regulations that 
interfere with valid federal objectives and announced it would preempt state laws on a case-by-
case basis.
8
 The 2015 Open Internet Order was more explicit, explaining it would preempt “state 
regulations that would conflict with the federal regulatory framework or otherwise frustrate 
federal broadband policies.”
9
 Similarly, the RIF Order expressly preempted “any state or local 
measures that would effectively impose rules or requirements” that the order repealed or rules 





The Mozilla court vacated this express preemption provision, finding that the agency failed to 
ground the clause in a lawful source of statutory authority.
11
 The court correctly noted that the 
Commission may preempt state law “only when and if it is acting within the scope of its 
congressionally delegated authority.”
12
 The RIF Order cites two sources of authority: the 
Impossibility Exception, which allows the agency to regulate intrastate communications where it 
is impossible to separate the intrastate and interstate components of a service, and the federal 
policy of nonregulation. The Court found that neither of these doctrines constitutes an 
affirmative grant of authority to which the express preemption provision could be tethered. 
 
But while vacating the express preemption provision, the court was careful to preserve the issue 
of conflict preemption, labeling it “wholly premature.”
13
 Conflict preemption occurs when a state 
law “frustrate[s] the accomplishment of a federal objective.”
14
 The agency cannot assert conflict 
preemption in the abstract, as the Mozilla court explained:  
 
Because a conflict-preemption analysis involves fact-intensive inquiries, it 
mandates deferral of review until an actual preemption of a specific state 
regulation occurs. Without the facts of any alleged conflict before us, we cannot 
begin to make a conflict-preemption assessment in this case, let alone a 
categorical determination that any and all forms of state regulation of intrastate 






The dissent worries that Mozilla has opened the floodgates of state broadband regulation, in 
which “the most draconian state policy trumps all else” and rendering the RIF Order 
meaningless.”
16
 But the majority responds this is not so: “If the Commission can explain how a 




III. Conflict Preemption and State Net Neutrality Efforts 
  
At first blush, it may seem odd that Mozilla can strike down the RIF Order’s preemption clause, 
and yet leave the door open for a future court to nonetheless find a state law is preempted. The 
resolution of this seeming conundrum lies in the difference between express and conflict 
preemption. Whereas express preemption turns on congressional intent – whether Congress has 
granted the agency authority to preempt state law in an area – conflict preemption focuses on the 
effect of dual sovereigns pursuing different objectives in an area of shared regulatory authority. 
Where state law frustrates the accomplishment of a federal objective, the state law must yield – 





The Supreme Court’s decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. illustrates how conflict 
preemption works in an analogous regulatory environment.
19
 Geier involved an automobile 
safety standard promulgated by the Department of Transportation pursuant to the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which granted the agency broad authority to 
establish “appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards” in the public interest.
20
 After 
experimenting with several different standards over time that varied in onerousness, the agency 
settled on requirement that automobile manufacturers equip some, but not all, of their vehicles 
with passive restraints such as airbags.
21
 After being injured in an automobile crash, the plaintiff 
sued the manufacturer, arguing that failure to provide an airbag violated state tort law despite 
being in compliance with the federal standard.
22
 The Act contained an express preemption 
clause, but the court found this inapposite, as the clause did not address tort claims. Nonetheless, 
the court found that the tort claim conflicted with the federal standard. 
 
The plaintiff argued that the agency merely set a minimum airbag standard, and states were free 
to adopt more stringent requirements above that minimum.
23
 But the court found otherwise, 
noting the agency “deliberately provided the manufacturer with a range of choices among 
different passive restraint devices” designed to “bring about a mix of different devices 
introduced gradually over time.”
24
 The agency specifically rejected an all-airbag standard, in part 
because of concerns about public backlash.
25
 The court found the state law claim was preempted 
because a “rule of state tort law imposing a duty to install airbags in cars such as petitioners' 
would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation 




The RIF Order reflects a similar exercise of the agency’s judgment regarding the appropriate 
way to regulate the broadband industry. In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that the 
Telecommunications Act's definitions were ambiguous, and therefore the Commission was free 
to classify broadband Internet access service as either a Title I information service or a Title II 
telecommunications service.
27
 The scope of the agency’s Title I power varies, based upon how 
the agency interprets ambiguous grants of authority like Section 706 and what rules the agency 
4 
 
determines are helpful to execute its clearly defined statutory powers. The scope of Title II also 
varies, as the statute gives the agency the power to forbear from applying particular provisions if 
the agency determines that “enforcement of the regulation or provision is not necessary” or if 




This flexibility creates a broad menu of potential regulatory options for the agency to choose 
from, all of which are permissible under the Communications Act as interpreted by Brand X. On 
one end of the spectrum, the agency could opt for a policy of complete nonregulation, 
disclaiming any interest in broadband whatsoever. On the other end, it could apply the full 
panoply of Title II obligations to broadband providers, up to and including rate regulation 
pursuant to tariffs filed with the Commission. Between these poles lie a host of potential 
regulatory bundles, including minimalist Title I requirements, a more robust common-law 
regulatory structure constructed using a more intensive Title I process, or a Title II-lite regime 





The RIF Order represents the agency’s policy judgment regarding the optimal regulatory bundle 
from among these options. Contrary to the claim made by some net neutrality advocates, the 
agency did not foreswear any jurisdiction over broadband access and abandon the field. Rather, it 
opted to classify broadband as an information service and subject it to specific transparency and 
disclosure obligations, coupled with enforcement of existing consumer protection and antitrust 
laws. But it decided against more intensive common carrier-like economic restrictions, which 
were likely to harm consumers and innovation. Significantly, the Mozilla court found this 




Therefore courts are likely to find that most state net neutrality initiatives “frustrate the 
accomplishment of a federal objective” by imposing duties that the Commission explicitly 
repealed as harmful and by reducing the flexibility that the Commission recognized as important 
to future growth. Here, as in Geier, the agency has adopted a careful regulatory scheme that 
balances trade-offs between more and less onerous requirements. More onerous state restrictions 
upset that balance and therefore are likely to be found preempted by the Supremacy Clause. 
 
The Mozilla court was not inclined to entertain these questions about potential conflict 
preemption in the abstract. But we may not have to wait long for courts to answer the question 
that Mozilla left open. Several states have already adopted net neutrality-like regulations by 
statute or by executive order, and (at least) two of those are the subject of live federal lawsuits 
challenging them as preempted: California’s SB822, and Vermont’s S289. 
 
A. California: Regulating the Internet from Sacramento 
 
SB822, the California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act, is the most 
aggressive state net neutrality statute passed in the wake of the RIF Order.
31
 Then-governor Jerry 
Brown signed the bill into law in September 2018, and the same day the Justice Department filed 
suit to enjoin the law.
32
 Both the statute and the case were stayed last year pending the Mozilla 
decision. Now that that case has been decided, and assuming the court's decision becomes final, 
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the district court in California can take up the preemption question at the center of the Justice 
Department’s suit. 
 
California cannot seriously argue that SB822 does not “frustrate the accomplishment of a federal 
objective” established by the RIF Order. The legislative history acknowledges that the act 
“adopts the main components of the net neutrality rules repealed by [the FCC].”
33
 Perhaps most 
notably, SB822 bans broadband providers serving California customers from engaging in paid 
prioritization. The RIF Order found that such bans chill innovation by both broadband and edge 
providers by limiting quality-of-service agreements, reduce economic efficiency, and harm 
consumer welfare.
34
 Permitting paid prioritization can improve network efficiency and 
potentially help narrow the digital divide.
35
 SB822 also prohibits blocking and throttling, rules 
that the RIF Order found unnecessary given the near-universal condemnation of these practices 
and the scant evidence of such behavior.
36
 SB822 also reinstates the general conduct standard, 
which the RIF Order condemns because its vagueness creates regulatory uncertainty and thus 
hinders innovation.
37
 Together, the RIF Order found these rules reduce overall network 
investment, a conclusion that the Mozilla court found reasonable. 
 
In some ways, the California statute reaches further, adopting rules that even the 2015 Open 
Internet Order declined to enact. For example, SB822 prohibits zero-rating, a practice that the 
2015 Order preferred to address on a case-by-case basis because the practice could benefit 
consumers. It also regulates broadband providers’ traffic exchange practices, including setting an 
effective rate of zero for direct-connection agreements regarding Internet traffic. By comparison, 
the RIF Order found that “freeing Internet traffic exchange arrangements from burdensome 
government regulation, and allowing market forces to discipline this emerging and competitive 




California could try to argue that its rules apply only to intrastate communications and therefore 
have no effect on interstate transmissions, but this is fundamentally flawed. The RIF Order 
found that “Because both interstate and intrastate communications can travel over the same 
Internet connection (and indeed may do so in response to a single query from a consumer), it is 
impossible or impracticable for ISPs to distinguish between intrastate and interstate 
communications over the Internet or to apply different rules in each circumstance. Accordingly, 
an ISP generally could not comply with state or local rules for intrastate communications without 
applying the same rules to interstate communications.”
39
 This finding was not challenged on 
appeal, and comports with the Commission’s consistent treatment of Internet access as a 





The purpose of the RIF Order was to subject broadband providers to a light-touch regulatory 
regime and eliminate the 2015 order’s common carriage-based rules. The effect – indeed, the 
express purpose – of SB822 is to reimpose the very regime that the RIF Order found harmful to 
consumers and innovation, with additional restrictions that even the Obama FCC declined to 
adopt. The court should have no trouble showing that SB822 frustrates the carefully-calibrated 





B. Vermont: Substituting the Power of the Purse 
 
The second statute currently in litigation is from Vermont. Rather than directly re-imposing net 
neutrality restrictions on broadband providers, as California has done, Vermont requires 
companies to adhere to such requirements as a condition of receiving government contracts. 
Under Vermont’s S289, state contracts for Internet access must include a state certification that 
the provider does not engage in blocking, throttling, paid prioritization, or unreasonable 
interference in the state.
41
 This case was challenged by a broadband consortium on preemption 
grounds.
42
 Like the California case, this suit was stayed pending the outcome of Mozilla, so the 
court may soon confront the question of conflict preemption. 
 
While the use of procurement law is an interesting twist that makes Vermont’s statute less 
intrusive than California’s, ultimately I suspect this statute will be preempted as well. The state is 
free to attach conditions to services that it purchases for its own use. So if Vermont merely 
required government contractors to guarantee net-neutral service to the government, it would 
likely be upheld. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned that “courts have found 
preemption when government entities seek to advance general societal goals rather than narrow 
proprietary interests through the use of their contracting power.”
43
 For example, in Wisconsin 
Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, the Supreme Court preempted a 
statute that prohibited the state from contracting with certain repeat violators of the National 
Labor Relations Act, on the ground that the additional penalty increased, and therefore conflicted 
with, the remedial scheme provided under the Act. The Court found it immaterial that 




Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council is also instructive.
45
 In the late 1990s, the federal 
government enacted a measured set of economic sanctions against Burma.
46
 Massachusetts 
enacted its own statute that prohibited the state from contracting with companies that did 
business with Burma, even if those companies were in compliance with the federal regime.
47
 
Like the net neutrality executive orders, the goal was to put pressure on companies to adopt 
voluntary practices that federal law refused to impose directly. Yet the Supreme Court 
unanimously preempted the Massachusetts law because it “conflicts with federal law at a number 
of points by penalizing individuals and conduct that Congress has explicitly exempted or 




Because the Vermont statute reaches beyond the terms of the government’s own contracts and 
instead attempts to regulate relationships between broadband providers and their customers, the 
act is an attempt to advance general societal goals, not the state’s proprietary interest. As a result, 
general conflict preemption principles apply, and the statute should be found preempted for the 
same reason the California state should be. 
 
C. Declaratory Ruling 
 
One question facing the Commission on remand is whether to trust the Justice Department to 
prosecute the California and Vermont cases, or whether the agency should issue a Declaratory 
Ruling itself that one or both statutes are preempted due to conflict. As numerous commenters 
have pointed out, the Declaratory Ruling is a procedural vehicle well-suited for this initiative. 
7 
 
Indeed, as recently as 2015, the Commission used a Declaratory Ruling to preempt state laws 




One reason the Commission might consider going this route is to offer its expert analysis of the 
true conflict between state and federal law, without being accused of merely taking a convenient 
position for the sake of litigation.
50
 As the author of the RIF Order, the Commission is the expert 
regarding whether a particular state provision conflicts with federal objectives. Its analysis is 
likely to help courts conduct their own preemption analyses. As the Geier court explained, “[t]he 
agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives and is 
‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements.”
51
 Here, the RIF 
Order clarified that “common-carriage requirements akin to those found in Title II,” as well as 
any other obligation equivalent to “rules or requirements that we repeal or refrain from imposing 
today,” would “pose an obstacle to or place an undue burden on the provision of broadband 
Internet access service” and would “conflict with the deregulatory approach we adopt today.”
52
 
A Declaratory Ruling examining, for example, California’s SB822, could clearly and explicitly 
identify the points of conflict with the RIF Order. “In these circumstances,” held the Geier 






By vacating the RIF Order’s express preemption provision, the Mozilla court left the door open 
for some state regulation of broadband services. But the opening is more like a crack than a wide 
swing. Under the principles of conflict preemption, states can only enact laws that do not 
frustrate a federal scheme. Where, as here, the federal rule establishes both the floor and ceiling 
of behavior, state laws survive conflict preemption only if they are consistent with the federal 
rule. 
 
There are many ways a state broadband statute could comport with the RIF Order. For example, 
a statute that provides an identical transparency and disclosure obligation, but which includes a 
different state-specific remedy for violations, may be consistent with the federal plan. So, too, 
could be general state consumer protection laws as applied to broadband providers. As the RIF 
Order itself explains, “we do not disturb or displace the states’ traditional role in generally 
policing such matters as fraud, taxation, and general commercial dealings, so long as the 
administration of such general state laws does not interfere with federal regulatory objectives.”
54
 
Moreover, state broadband laws that supplement federal policy in different ways would be 
welcomed. Vermont’s S289, for example, requires the Attorney General to conduct a net 
neutrality study and creates a connectivity initiative to prioritize and fund broadband buildout 
into unserved and underserved areas, neither of which are inconsistent with the RIF Order. 
 
But state laws that simply reimpose restrictions that the FCC has repealed are doomed to fail. 
Even if they survive conflict preemption, state laws that regulate what is inherently an interstate 
– indeed, global – network could run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause, as I discussed in 
an earlier Perspectives article.
55
 Both doctrines push toward the same laudatory goal: to prevent 
states from balkanizing the Internet and undermining the Federal Communications 




* Daniel A. Lyons, a Professor at Boston College Law School, is a Member of the Free State 
Foundation’s Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an independent, 
nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located in Rockville, Maryland. 
 
 
                                                 
1




 Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).  
4








 Id. at 142-143. 
8
 Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17970 n.374 (2010). 
9
 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5804 (2015). 
10
 Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 427 (2018) (“RIF Order”). 
11
 Mozilla at 121. 
12
 Id. at 122-123 (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)). 
13
 Id. at 145. 
14
 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000). 
15
 Mozilla at 136-137 (quoting Alascom, Inc. v. FCC, 727 F.2d 1212, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal quotation 
marks removed). 
16
 Mozilla (Williams, J., dissenting) at 1, 23. 
17
 Mozilla at 142-143. 
18
 Geier, 529 U.S. at 873. 
19
 Id. at 861. 
20
 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (repealed by Pub.L. 
103-272 § 7(b), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1379). 
21
 Geier, 529 U.S. at 864. 
22
 Id. at 865. 
23
 Id. at 874. 
24
 Id. at 874-875. 
25
 Id. at 879. 
26
 Id. at 863. 
27
 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
28
 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2018). 
29
 See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommunications, 54 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 1029, 1041 n.64 (2012) (discussing Title II–lite regime). 
30
 Mozilla at 85-86. 
31
 S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018). 
32
 See Larry Downes, California’s Net Neutrality Publicity Stunt Comes to an End, FORBES, Oct. 29, 2018; United 
States v. California, No. 2:18-at-01539 (E.D. Cal, filed Sept. 30, 2018). 
33
 Cal. S. Comm. on Energy, Utils., & Commc’ns, SB 460 Analysis 1 (2018). 
34
 RIF Order ¶¶254-256. 
35
 Id. ¶ 260. 
36
 Id. ¶ 265-266. 
37
 Id. ¶ 246. 
38
 Id. ¶ 168. 
39
 Id.¶ 200. 
40
 See ¶ 199. 
41
 S. 289, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2(b)(1)(A–E) (Vt. 2018). 
42
 See ACA v. Scott, No. 2:18-cv-00167 (D. Vt., filed Oct. 18, 2018). 
9 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
43
 Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair v. City of Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 692 (5
th
 Cir. 1999); see also Wisconsin 
Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986). 
44
 Gould, 475 U.S. at 289. 
45
 530 U.S. 363. 
46
 Id. at 368. 
47
 Id. at 376. 
48
 Id. at 378. 
49
 See City of Wilson, North Carolina Petition for Preemption, 30 FCC Rcd. 2408 (2015). 
50
 Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (discounting post-hoc rationalizations taken in litigation). 
51
 Geier. at 883 (quoting Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996)). 
52
 Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 428 (2018). 
53
 Geier, 529 U.S. at 883. 
54
 RIF Order ¶ 196. 
55
 Daniel A. Lyons, State Net Neutrality Mandates and the Dormant Commerce Clause, PERSPECTIVES FROM FSF 
SCHOLARS Vol. 14, No. 14 (2019). 
